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INTRODUCTION 
This analysis reviews whether the logical extension of the socio-
economic costs caused by pathological gambling should include a negative 
socio-economic (i.e., "crime") multiplier in gambling costlbenefit analyses. 
Traditional economic theory posits that normal consumer spending benefits 
the economy by more than just the amount spent, as that money is reinvested 
in the economy. Arguably however, consumer dollars diverted into gambling 
dollars have a diminished economic multiplier effect. The contention is that 
added to this diminished economic mUltiplier, there should be a' socio-
economic "crime" multiplier--due to the unique socio-economic costs 
inherent in state-sanctioned gambling activities. During the 199Os, socio-
economic experts directed academic attention to the new addicted gamblers, 
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new bankruptcies, and new crime that occurred in the United States during the 
1980s and 1990s when state governments decriminalized organized gambling 
activities. The starting point for such cost analyses can be fOWld in the tables 
and accompanying footnotes in the article The Costs of Addicted Gamblers: . 
Should the States Initiate Mega-Lawsuits Similar to the Tobacco Cases? 
(Mega-Lawsuits). J These costs will be summarized at the end of this analysis, 
but fIrst there are two preliminary questions that should be reviewed: 
1. When consumer dollars are transferred into decriminalized gambling 
activities is the normal economic multiplier effect diminished? 
2. When consumer dollars are transferred into decriminalized gambling 
activities could the economic multiplier effect be not only diminished, 
but also an overall "negative" economic multiplier? 
By the 1990s there were authoritative pronoWlcements substantiating both of 
these propositions. In either instance, the question was then: Should the 
economic multiplier have added to it a socio-economic crime multiplier to 
reflect the socio-economic costs of decriminalized organized gambling? 
I. DELIMITATION OF PROBLEMS 
A. Bizarre Economic Multipliers Claimed by the United States Gambling 
Industry: The Lack of Industry Credibility 
In 1992, the lliinois Economic and Fiscal Policy Commission appeared 
to struggle with the multiplier issue in its study of gambling in lliinois and 
implied that there were problems with calculating potential economic activity 
when legalized gambling activities were involved.2 In the economic multiplier 
context, the legalized gambling industry has made bizarre claims, such as 
claiming a multiplier of "4" several times during a 1997 National Press 
I. See John Warren Kindt, The Costs of Addicted Gamblers: Should the States Initiate 
Mega-Lawsuits Similar to the Tobacco Cases?, 22 MANAGERIAL & DECISION EcoN. 17,44-63, 
tbls.A l-A14 (200 1) [hereinafter Kindt, Mega-Lawsuits]; see also Professor John Warren Kindt, 
U.S. and International Concerns Over the Socio-Economic Costs of Legalized Gambling: 
Greater than the megal Drug Problem?, Statement to the National Gambling Impact Study 
Commission, at charts & tbls. (May 2 I, 1998) (transcript available at http://govinfo.Iibrary.unt. 
edulngisclmeetingslmay2I98/p40S21.pdt) [hereinafter U.S. and International Costs]. 
2. See Iu.. BeON. & FISCAL CoMM'N, WAGERING IN ILUNOIS: A REPORT ON THE 
EcoNOMIC IMPACT OF EXISTING AND PROPOSED FORMS OF GAMBLING 82 (1992). 
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Foundation Conference.3 In another example, a multiplier of"S" to "6" was 
claimed by gambling interests in a 1997 advertisement in the St. Louis Post-
Dispatch that attempted to publicize the "Employment Opportunities" that 
gambling allegedly created.4 These outrageous claims of "gambling 
multipliers" were twice as large as the average multipliers the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) reported as being between "2" and "3."s 
B. Legalized Gambling as Diminishing or Negating the Multiplier Effect of 
"Consumer Dollars" 
While the spending of consumer dollars in an economy constitutes a 
positive economic multiplier effect (usually between "2" and "3" in most 
scenarios), during the 1990s academics postulated that the multiplier effect 
was less when those same consumer dollars were spent in decriminalized 
gambling activities-thus, constituting a net drain on an economy. In 1991, 
academics even theorized that legalized gambling activities, such as casino 
activities, might constitute a negative economic "multiplier effect.,,6 The 
potential negative multiplier effect associated with legalized gambling 
3. See National Press Foundation, GambJing-the New American Pasttime, 
Presentation atthe National Press Foundation Conference (Jan. 13-15, 1997). For a 2003 study 
sponsored by pro-gambling interests in Illinois, see REG'L ECON. ApPUCATIONS LAB., 
EcONOMIC IMPACT OF THE CASINO GAMING INDUSTRY ON THE STATE OF ILLINOIS AND LocAL 
CoMMUNITIES, Jan. 2003 (REAL 2003 Casino Study). While the REAL 2003 Casino Study 
made some valid points, the public relations "spin" on this report that was promulgated by pro-
gambling interests (including the Illinois Chamber of Commerce) claimed a de facto job 
multipJier of "5" as wen as other nonsensical claims. Press Release, Jasculca!fennan and 
Associates, University of Illinois Study Shows Casinos' Better Dealfor Illinois Would Inject 
52.2 Billion, 26,000 New Jobs into State Economy, available at 
www.ilchamber.org/ic/newslNR030129.asp(Jan. 29,2003)(partofa5S00,000publicrelations 
campaign). The savvy Illinois news media were not deceived and editorialized against the 
claims of the pro-gambJing interests. See, e.g., Editorial, Expanded Gambling Won't Boost 
Illinois, NEWS-GAZETTE, Feb. 11,2003, at A6. Academics, such as Economics Professor Fred 
Gottheil at the University of IIJinois, also rejected the nonsensical claims of the pro-gambling 
interests. See, e.g., Phil Luciano, Diamonds in Clubs: Tavern Poker Machines Could Mean 
Millionsfor State, PEORIA J. STAR, Feb. 19,2003, at Al (citing Economics Professor Fred 
Gottheil), available at 2003 WL 8549465. 
4. See Casino Industry Advertisement, Employment Opportunities, ST. LoUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Jan. 19, 1997, at 17G. 
5. See BUREAU OF EcON. ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, REGIONAL 
MULTIPUERS (3d ed. 1997) [hereinafter RIMS 1997]. 
6. See Paul Teske & Bela Sur, Winners and Losers: Politics, Casino Gambling, and 
Development in Atlantic City, 10 POL'y STUD. REv. 130, 135-36 (1991); see also Thomas P. 
Hamer, The Casino Industry in Atlantic City: What Has It Done for the Local Economy?, Bus. 
REv., Jan.-Feb. 1982, at 3. 
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activities received new emphasis in a 1994 University of Massachusetts 
report,7 as well as in United States Congressional Hearings before the United 
States House Subcommittee on Small Business.s 
In the context of the "diminished multiplier effect," it was reported in 
1993 on the floor of Congress that the multiplier effect for Atlantic City's 
experience with casinos was low.9 A couple of years earlier in 1991, 
co~authors Paul Teske of the Southern University of New York and Bela Sur 
of the University of Nebraska had reported that the multiplier effect of the 
casinos in Atlantic City not only was less than what was anticipated, but also 
was limited to the area around the casinos' enclave, which operated to the 
overall detriment of the regional economy.IO 
The economic benefits have not spread beyond the casinos; the anticipated "multiplier 
effect" has not moved much beyond the core industry. Many local residents are still 
poor and unemployed, half of the population still receives public assistance, and city 
services continue to be substandard. Social problems, including increased crime and 
prostitution, are worse than ever. Since most people holding the better casino jobs 
live in Atlantic City suburbs, they contribute little directly to the city. II 
Without considering the socio-taxpayer costs that accompany 
decriminalized gambling (but which do not accompany consumer industries), 
the economic drain itself can be demonstrated by a sample scenario. By 2002 
pro-gambling interests, such as the Osage Tribe, were publicly admitting a 
negative regional cash flow to be caused by the tribe's proposed Kansas 
casino. Specifically, it was evident that the planned "casino would drain 
537 million to $46 million from the surrounding 50 mile radius region 
annually, obviously a serious detrimental economic impact."12 This scenario 
was analyzed at a June 2002 meeting of the National Council of Legislators 
7. See ROBERT GOODMAN, LEGAUZED GAMBLING AS A STRATEGY FOR EcONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 51-56 (1994). 
8. See The National Impact of Casino Gambling Proliferation: Hearing Before the 
House Comm. on Small Bus., 103d Congo 77 (1994) [hereinafter Congressional Gambling 
Hearing 1994]; see also National Gambling Impact and Policy Commission Act: Hearing on 
H.R. 497 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 1 04th Cong~ (1995) [hereinafter 
Congressional Gambling Hearing 1995]. 
9. See Legalized Gambling in D.C. Is a Real Loser, 139 CoNG. REc. H6500, H6501 
(1993) (statement of Rep. Wolt) [hereinafter Gambling a Loser]. 
10. See Teske & Sur, supra note 6, at 136; see also Gambling A Loser, supra note 9, 
at H6500, H650I. 
11. Gambling A Loser, supra note 9, at H6501 (quoting Teske & Sur, supra note 6, at 
130). 
12. Glenn O. Thompson, Economic Impact of Convenience Casinos on Surrounding 
Communities, Remarks at the Summer Meeting of the National Council of Legislators from 
Gaming States 3 (June 1, 2002) [hereinafter Thompson to Legislators from Gaming States] (on 
111,. utith llllthnr' 
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from Gaming States. 13 By utilizing ''revenue and payroll data from the tribe's 
press release,14 the following cash flow data was [sic] developed for the two 
revenue estimates, $75 million and $100 million, discussed in the press 
release:"u 
Economic: Impact of Osage tribe casino 
on surrounding SO mile radius regionl6 
Low ($ M) High ($ M) 
Money into casino ($ M annually) 
Revenue from within region (85%) 
Revenue from outside region (15%) 
Total casb into casino (net revenue after prizes) 
Money out of casino ($ M annually) 
Payroll (Assume 100% remains within region) 
Other expense spent within region (15% of revenue) 
Money that leaves region 
Total cash out of casino 
Region net cash flow ($ M annually) 
Cash into region 
Cash out of region 
Net casb flow 
$64 
11 
$75 
$16 
II 
48 
$75 
$11 
(48) 
$(37) 
85 
II 
$100 
$24 
15 
61 
$100 
S15 
LW 
$(46) 
This type of casino scenario involved bringing "convenience gambling" to the 
local population base, which means that the gambling would be conveniently 
accessible to the public. The analysis also demonstrated that for the state's 
regional community to break-even economically, the gambling activities had 
to attract approximately SO percent more new tourists (not pre-existing 
tourists) from out-ol-state.17 This problem was one reason why the 1996-1999 
National Gambling Impact Study Commission (NOISC or 1999 United States 
Gambling Commission) unanimously recommended the recrimina1ization of 
13. See id. 
14. See Press Release, Osage Tribe, Land Acquired in Chautauqua County for Possible 
Casino (May 8, 2001 ).athttp://www.osagetribe.comlgaming.htm [hereinafter Osage Tribe Press 
Release 2001]. 
1 S. Thompson to Legislators from Gaming States, supra note 12, at 3. 
16. Id. (citing Osage Tribe Press Release 2001, supra note 14). 
17. See infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text. See generally lohn Warren Kindt, 
Legalized Gambling Activities: The Issues InvolVing Market Saturation, IS N. Ill.. U. L. REv: 
271 (1995) [hereinafter Kindt, Market Saturation]. 
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"convenience gambling. ,,18 The exceptions were Las Vegas (80 to 90 percent 
out-of-state tourists), Atlantic City (approximately 50 to 60 percent out-of-
state towists), and Windsor, Ontario (70 to 80 percent out-of-country United 
States tourists and which did not involve "convenience gambling"). 19 
However, even these gambling communities still constituted strategic 
economic drains on the overall United States economy.20 
In the application of BE A methodologies to gambling activities, the most 
comprehensive and insightful study was a leading edge 1994 report 
co-authored by a large team of Florida government economists and titled 
Casinos In Florida: An Analysis of the Economic and Social Impacts'll 
(Florida Governor's Report). The methodology utilized by the Florida 
Governor's Report, as headed by Dr. Subhasis Das, was delimited as follows: 
The cornerstone of this approach is the estimation of the amount of net new spending 
in Florida by casino visitors. First, the number of casino visits and amount of per 
capita spending will be estimated separately. The next step will be the determination 
of the proportion of casino expenditures substituted from current expenditures on 
other entertainment choices. The substituted expenditures will be deducted to obtain 
the actual new spending. The total direct impact of casinos can then be obtained by 
multiplying the per capita new spending due to casinos by the number of casino 
visitors. The direct impact will be multiplied by RIMS 1122 output, employment, and 
earnings multipliers to obtain the total economic impact in terms of output, jobs, and 
income.23 
Into the 21st century, the Florida Governor's Report remained a consistent 
model for economists examining the interface between BEA methodologies 
and legalized gambling activities. .' 
18. See, e.g., NAT'L GAMBUNG IMPACT STUDY COMM'N, FINAL REPORT, 
recommendation 3.6, at 3-18 (1999) [hereinafter NGISC FINAL REPoRT]; NAT'L GAMBLING 
IMPACTSruDYCOMM'N, ExEcUTIVE SUMMARY, recommendation 3.6, at 30 (1999) [hereinafter 
NGISC EXEcUTIVE SUMMARY]. For the legislation, see National Gambling Impact Study 
Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 104-169, 110 Stat. 1482 (J996) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1955) 
(signed into law Aug. 3, 1996). 
19. See generally infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text. 
20. For an example of the economic "cannibalization" and 196,000 lost jobs in 
Southern California caused by Las Vegas see CAL. GoVERNOR'S OFFICE OF PI.ANNING & 
REsEARCH, CAUFORNIA AND NEVADA: SUBSIDY, MONOPOLY, AND COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF 
LEGALIZED GAMBLING (1992). For an overview of decriminalized gambling's cannibalization 
of the United States economy see John Warren Kindt, U.S. National Security and the Strategic 
Economic Base: The Business/Economic Impacts of the Legalization of Gambling Activities, 
39 ST. LoUIS U. L.J. 567 (1995) [hereinafter Kindt, Strategic Economic Base]. 
21. See OFFICE OF PLANNING & BUDGETING, FLA. ExEcuTIVE OFFICE OF THE 
GoVERNOR, CASINOS IN FIDRIDA: AN ANALYSIS OF THE EcONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACTS (1994) 
[hereinafter FLA. Gov. REPORT]. 
22. For explanations of the RIMS system, see CLARIFICATION OF GoALS infra Part II. 
?~ FT" nov RRPnRT C'tlnrn n"t,.?l At?4\ 
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C. Legalized Gambling as Creating a Negative Socio-Economic "Crime 
Multiplier" for CostlBenefit Analyses 
Not only was there the question of whether there should be less of a 
multiplier for legalized gambling activities, such as casinos, but also there was 
the question of whether there should be a socio-economic "crime multiplier." 
In a definitive ''before and after" study of all relevant United States casinos in 
their feeder markets called Casinos and Crime, Professor Earl Grinols, 
Professor David Mustard, and Cynthia Dilley highlighted these issues.24 First, 
Casinos and Crime indicated that casinos could ''raise crime by harming 
economic development."25 Casinos could be criticized "for draining the local 
economy, attracting unsavory clients, and for outgrowths like prostitution and 
illegal gambling-related activities. ,,26 Second, casinos could "increase crime 
by lowering the information costs and increasing the potential benefits of 
illegal activity."27 Third, crime could "increase because casinos attract 
visitors who may commit and be victims of crime. ,,28 Finally, criminal 
activities could "increase through problem and pathological gamblers. ,,29 
Paralleled to earlier economic reports done in 199530 and 199631 by 
Professor William Thompson, Ricardo Gazel, and Dan Rickman, an analysis 
in 2000 of video gambling in South Dakota summarized Professor 
Thompson's interpretation of a negative socio-economic "crime" multiplier 
in legalized gambling scenarios. First, Professor Thompson calculated the 
"social costs" per South Dakota adult from legalized video gambling,32 as the 
following chart indicates: 
24. See generally Earl L. Grinols et al., Casinos and Crime (1999) [hereinafter Grinols 
et aI., Casinos and Crime] (on file with author). 
25. [d. atS. 
26. [d. 
27. [d. 
28. [d. 
29. [d. 
30. See, e.g., WIWAM THOMPSON ET AL., WIS. POL'y REsEARCH INST., WISCONSIN 
POUCY REsEARCH INSTITUTE REPoRT: THE EcoNOMIC IMPACT OF NATIVE AMERICAN GAMING 
IN WISCONSIN, Aprill99S [hereinafter THoMPSON ET AL., WIS. PoL'y REs. INST.]. 
31. See, e.g., William N. Thompson & Ricardo C. Gazel, The Monetary Impacts of 
Riverboat Casino Gambling in Rlinois (1996) (on file with author). 
32. See Presentation by Professor William N. Thompson, Presentation to the Annual 
Conference of the National Coalition Against Legalized Gambling, Sioux Falls, S.D., Oct. 13, 
2000 [hereinafter Thompson Analysis]; Professor William N. Thompson, Searching for a 
Theory from and for Studies of Gambling, Presentation to the Symposium on Gambling: Betting 
on the Future: Taking Gaming and the Law into the 21st Century, Benjamin N. Cardozo School 
of Law (Nov. 15, 1999). . 
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Social Costs33 
(Cost per adult in South Dakota) 
Crime (Deloitte & Touche)34 
Treatment (Deloitte & Touche)3s 
Divorce 
Civil Cases (Bankruptcy) 
Productivity 
Theft (e.g., Embezzlement) 
Bad Debt 
$54 
$ 16 
$ 1 
$ 3 
$ 31 
$ 10 
$2 
[Approximately] $120 
For 2000, the total calculated social costs36 were approximately $120 per 
South Dakota adult.37 When $120 was multiplied by the population base of 
525,000 adults, the total costs were $63 million.38 Then utilizing the State of 
South Dakota's own calculations, Professor Thompson summarized the 
economic costs.39 
Locals 
Profits Out 20% 
Machine Costs 
Employment Taxes 
Regulation Costs 
Excess Profit Tax 
Total 
Economic Costs40 
$ In 
$190 million 
Total Benefit/Cost (per machine) $23,750 
$ Out 
$171 million 
$ 19 million 
$ 4 million 
$ 1 million 
$ 2 million 
$ 19 million 
($216 million) 
($28,000) 
Thus, Professor Thompson calculated the economic benefit to South Dakota 
as a net economic loss of $26 million (or $4,250 per machine).41 Adding the 
social costs of $63 million to the net economic loss of $26 million equaled a 
total loss of$89 million per year.42 Interestingly, Professor Thompson then 
applied a multiplier of "2" to this total by calculating that dollars circulated 
33. Thompson Analysis, supra note 32. 
34. DEI.DIITE & TOUCHE, EcoNOMIC AND FISCAL IMPACTS OF THE SOUTH DAKOTA 
GAMING INDUSTRY: FINAL REPORT 138-43 (1998) [hereinafter S.D. GAMING REPORT 1998]. 
35. Id. at 126-35. . 
36. See generally id. at 126-43. 
37. See Thompson Analysis, supra note 32. 
38. Seeid. 
39. See id. 
40. Seeid. 
41. See id. 
42. See id. 
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twice before leaving the economy-resulting in a net annual loss of 
$178 million (or $22,250 per machine) to the South Dakota economy. 43 While 
this analysis was a basic summary, the gravamen was that Professor 
Thompson was calculating a combined socio-economic multiplier of "2" as 
part of a normal costlbenefit analysis of legalized gambling activities. 
IT. CLARIFICATION OF GoALS 
A. A Summary of the Regional Industrial Multiplier System (RIMS) 
In the economic era following World War IT, United States economists 
recognized that the federal government needed to provide resources for 
"[e]ffective planning for public- and private-sector projects and programs at 
the State and local levels, ,~ and that this goal required "a systematic analysis 
of the economic impacts of the projects and programs on affected regions.,,4S 
The systematic analysis of economic impacts also needed to "account for the 
interindustry relationships within regions because these relationships largely 
determine how regional economies are likely to respond to project and 
program changes.,,46 Accordingly, during "the 1970's, the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) developed a method for estimating regional 1-0 
[Input-Output] mUltipliers lmown as RIMS (Regional Industrial Multiplier 
System). ,,47 Historical BEA analyses of each United States industry resulted 
in an 1-0 table that showed ''the distribution of the inputs purchased and the 
outputs sold.'t48 For example, a 
typical 1-0 table in RIMS II [the successor to RIMS] is derived mainly from two data 
sources: BEA's national 1-0 table, which shows the input and output structure of 
nearly 500 U.S. industries, and BEA's regionaJ economic accounts, which are used 
to adjust the national 1-0 table in order to reflect a region's industrial structure and 
trading patterns.49 
43. See Thompson Analysis, supra note 32. In a similar costlbenetit analysis for a 
proposed Native American casino for Beloit, Wisconsin in 1999-2000, Professor Thompson 
calculated the total net socio-economic loss to the state at $7,182,887, and with a multiplier of 
"2" the net loss was $14,365,774. Beloit itself would experience concentrations of the socio-
economic costs. William Thompson, Economic and Social Costs of Beloit Casino: A Local 
Region Analysis (2000) (on tile with author). 
44. RIMS 1997, supra note 5, at 1. 
45. [d . 
. 46. [d. 
47. [d. 
48. [d. 
49. Jd. 
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B. Standard RIMS Analyses Are Inapplicable to Total Gambling Impacts: 
RIMS Equals Only Half the Fonnula 
1.· RIMS Equals Only Half of the Gambling Formula: Socio-Economic 
Costs Must Be Included 
The main problem with applying RIMS analyses to the economic 
impacts of gambling activities is that legalized gambling is uniquely 
inapplicable to RIMS. In gambling, RIMS analysis equals only half of the 
fonnula. In the standard categories of the RIMS system, there is no 
"gambling" category, no "gambling multiplier" per se, and no RIMS history 
oflegalized gambling (since gambling was criminalized for almost a century). 
Accordingly, RIMS ·analysts tend to group gambling dollars under some type 
of entertainment, but "gambling dollars" are unique-and are definitely not 
"consumer dollars. ,,50 Although traditional economists may feel 
uncomfortable analyzing gambling activities with RIMS, the unique socio-
economic costs inherent in gambling dollars must be addressed and included 
in any regional analysis. The tables in Mega-.Lawsuits provide a beginning for 
fonnulaic analyses involving how much of a socio-economic "crime 
multiplier" should be utilized.51 
2. RIMS Analyses and the Case of Rlinois Casinos 
In 1996 Professor William Thompson and economist Ricardo Gazel 
utilized RIMS in their report, The Monetary Impacts of Riverboat Casino 
Gambling in Rlinois. 52 The RIMS analysis of casinos in Dlinois demonstrated 
that the casinos generated $1.3 billion in revenue for the economy, S3 but the 
net loss to the overall state economy was a conservative calculation of 
$6.7 million,54 and the net loss to the local lliinois economies was 
$240 million. 55 The Thompson and Gazel report prodded a follow-up 1998 
report financed by the Dlinois Gaming Board, The Impact of Riverboat Casino 
Gambling on the Rlinois Economy, 1991-199556 (REAL 1998 Report). 
so. See generally Kindt, Market Saturation, supra note 17. 
51. See Kindt, Mega-Lawsuits, supra note 1, at 44-63, tbls.A I-A 14. 
52. See Thompson & Gazel, supra note 31 ; see also Press Release, J. Terrence Brunner, 
Economic Impact Report of Riverboat Casinos in Illinois (June 11, 1996). 
53. See Brunner, supra note 52. 
54. Seeid. 
55. Seeid. 
56. See GEOFFREY J.D.HEWINGSET AL,REG'LEcoN. APPUCATIONS LAB., THE IMPACT 
OF RIvERBOAT CASINO GAMBUNGON THE IWNOISEcoNOMY, 1991-1995 (1998, update 2001) 
[hereinafter REAL 1998 REPORT]. 
292 Law Review [Vol. 2:281 
The 1998 analysis was prepared by the Regional Economics 
Applications Laboratory (REAL), a research branch of the University of 
lllinois, and it indicated that there were positive economic impacts attributable 
to the influx of dollars accompanying casino gambling. 57 The report stated 
that "[t]he riverboat casino industry generated, directly and indirectly, more 
than 17,000 jobs, $1.27 billion in goods and services, $778 million in income 
and $330 million in taxes in 1995."58 Furthermore, the ''riverboat.s created 
more than 6,500 jobs in such areas as agriculture and mining, manufacturing, 
trade and finance. ,,59 Educated to the shortcomings of RIMS analyses when 
applied to legalized gambling, Geoffrey J.D. Hewings, the project director for 
this report, said that he did not factor in the negative effects that came from 
introducing casino riverboats, such as the increased crime or the increased 
numbers of gambling addicts.60 Like traditional economic analyses of 
non-gambling activities, Hewings indicated that REAL's role was ''basically 
to look at one side of this, and then it's up to others to look at the [negative 
effects].,,61 The report also revealed that lllinois residents annually lost about 
$40 more per person than the average national losses per person.62 
The lllinois press noted the shortcomings of RIMS in the REAL 1998 
Report analysis when applied to legalized gambling.63 
Abserit from the group's report, drawn up for the Illinois Gaming Board, [was] 
the economic impact of dollars spent on a floating casino that could have been spent 
elsewhere and the social costs of problem gamblers. 
And, one of the more sobering Statistics buried on the last two pages of the 
report is that gamblers in Illinois lose 24 percent more on average than bettors in 
states with legalized gambling.64 
Furthermore, the lllinois press was detailing some of the problems in studies 
of legalized gambling activities as they interfaced with consumer-oriented 
RIMS analysis.65 
No one has come up with a satisfactory figure for estimating how much money 
gambling may divert from other consumer spending. But one gambling expert said 
problem gamblers are draining 51.1 billion a year from Illinois because of the ills they 
57. See Ed Bierschenk, Report Verifies Positive Economic Impact of Riverboats, ST. 
I.-REG., May )4, )998, at 13. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. Seeid. 
61. Id. 
62. See ide 
63. See, e.g., Ted Gregory, Report Offers Lopsided Look at Riverboats, CHI. TRIB., 
May 15, )998, § 2, at 12. 
64. Id. 
65. See ide 
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cause, ranging from crimes to social maladies to bankruptcies and beyond. These are 
shortcomings fully acknowledged by the study's project director, Geoffrey J.D. 
Hewings.66 
According to Professor Robert Goodman at the University of Massachusetts, 
pro~bling lobbyists were causing confusion among some experts 
lUlfamiliar with gambling's unique economic nuances.67 
"If you don't look at either the substitution effect (of casino wagers that would have 
been spent elsewhere) or the impact of additional public problems, you're not getting 
useful information," said Robert Goodman, director of the U.S. Gambling Research 
Institute in Amherst, Mass., and author of the book, "The Luck Business: The 
Devastating Consequences and Broken Promises of America's Gambling 
Explosion. ,.68 
Except for not addressing the socio-economic costs, the REAL 1998 
Report revealed that "[ e ]ach dollar expended by the casino operations 
generated an additional $0.72 worth of activity elsewhere in the state's 
economy't69 (that is, a dollar multiplier effect of"!. 72"). By comparison, most 
consumer dollars would have generated a dollar multiplier effect of"2" to "3." 
Therefore, a "consumer dollar" could have up to a 100 percent greater 
mllltiplier effect than a gambling dollar. Furthermore, "[e]achjob created by 
the casino industry generate[d] another 0.70 jobs in the economy" (that is, a 
job multiplier of "1.7").70 However, the geographic scope was limited and 
more in-depth "regional" analys~s indicated that approximately one job was 
being lost for every one job created.71 The lost lllinois jobs from the regional 
"feeder markets" during relatively the same time periods were revealed in the 
1995 Congressional hearings before the United States House of 
Representatives Judiciary Committee.72 An analysis of a 2000 Deloitte and 
Touche report on South Dakota revealed that the video gambling machines 
were draining consumer dollars away from consumer businesses and costing 
a net loss of 640 jobs on an adult population base of approximately 525,000.73 
Furthermore, a 2000 report from Australia, the most saturated gambling 
66. Id. 
67. SeeUl. 
68. Ted Gregory, Report Gives Lopsided Look into Riverboat Economics, CHI. TRm., 
May 15, 1998 (Du Page County ed. ) (on file with author); see also ROBERT GooDMAN, THE 
LUCK BusINESS: THE DEVASTATING CONSEQUENCES AND BROKEN PROMISES OF AMERICA'S 
GAMBUNG ExPLosION (1995). 
69. REAL 1998 REPORT, supra note 56, at 2. 
70. Id. 
71. See Congressional Gambling Hearing /995, supra note 8 (jobs analysis of Illinois). 
72. Seeid. 
73. See, e.g., Pat Loonger, Gambling's Hidden Costs Far Outweigh Its Benefits, 
LINCOLN J. STAR, Dec. 28, 2000; see also S.D. GAMING REPORT 1998, supra note 34, at 116. 
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country in the world, revealed that for every three video gambling machines 
(which technically created zero casino jobs), two net consumer jobs were lost 
from the surrounding "feeder market. ,,74 
Finally, the REAL 1998 Report indicated that "[e]ach dollar of direct 
income provided to employees in the casino industry generate[ d] about $1.5 
of additional income,,7S (that is, a multiplier effect of "2.5"). However, a 
"consumer dollar" multiplier effect would be similar; that is, between "2" and 
"3." Furthermore, throughout the 1990s between 80 to 90 percent of casino 
revenues were generated by automation-video gambling ''rnachines''-whose 
revenues did not require employees with concomitant job salaries, health 
benefits, uniforms, retirement benefits, vacations, and other benefits that 
would be required in the consumer jobs economy.76 
While there were equivocations and exceptions to each of these 
observations, an in-depth review of those considerations is beyond the scope 
of the present analysis. These observations were highlighted for future 
academic discussion. 
m. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A. No Economic Reports Indicate that Legalized Gambling is a Valid 
Strategy for Economic Development 
Throughout the 20th century, there was not a single economic report 
indicating that legalized gambling constituted a valid model for economic 
development on a strategic or regional basis." During the 1990s and early 
21st century, pro-gambling interests produced or financed many so-called 
"studies" that indicated local communities would benefit, but literally all of 
the studies were invalid in their SCOpe7S and were oftenjust exercises in public 
relations for pro-gambling interests.79 Typically, the studies financed by 
74. See, e.g., Royce Millar, Councils Eye Odds on Polcie Damage, AGE CoMPANY 
LIMITED 2000, Oct. 22, 2000. For analyses of the large percentages of pathological (addicted) 
and problem gamblers in Australia and the increasing associated costs, see AusTL. INST. FOR 
GAMBUNG REsEARCH, SURVEY OF THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF GAMBLING AND PROBLEM 
GAMBLING IN THE ACT (July 2001). 
75. REAL 1998 REPORT, supra note 56, at 2. 
76. See S.D. GAMING REPoRT 1998, supra note 34, at 116-19. 
77. See, e.g., GooDMAN, supra note 7; Meir Gross, Legal Gambling as a Strategy for 
Economic Development, 12 BooN. DEV. Q. 203 (1998). 
78. See, e.g., GooDMAN,supra note 7, at exec. summary (analyzing fourteen reports). 
79. See itl. at 68. 
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pro-gambling interests were invalid "BenefitlBenefit" studies80 and not 
CostlBenefit studies.81 
By 1997, studies financed by the gambling industry were readily 
admitting that they were "BenefitIBenefit" studies and not CostlBenefit 
studies. For example, the 1998 Missouri study fmanced by Civic Progress did 
not analyze or even consider the socio-economic costs,82 and the 1996 and 
1997 Arthur Andersen studies83 were of pre-selected industry positives.84 
Each Arthur Andersen study specifically stated: ''this study makes no attempt 
to analyze the socioeconomic effects of . . . gaming. ,,8S In addition, the 
communities selected for the Arthur Andersen (Micro) study would be 
expected to yield positive local impacts.86 By comparison, an analysis of the 
Kansas City economy indicated that the casinos were probably draining a net 
$50 million per year from the area,87 but these losses were masked by the size 
of the Kansas City economy. 88 
B. Academic and Economic Reports Not Financed by Pro-Gambling Interests 
Uniformly Report that Legalized Gambling Does Not Constitute Valid 
Economic Development Strategy 
One valid example of a costlbenefit analysis of gambling was a 1995 
study of the socio-economic impacts of Native American casinos in 
80. See, e.g., ARTHUR ANDERSEN, EcoNOMIC IMPACTS OF CASINO GAMING IN THE 
UNITED STATES: MACRO SruDY 1 (Dec. 1996) (prepared for the Am. Gaming Ass'n) 
[hereinafter ANDERSEN MACRO S11JDY]; ARTHUR ANDERSEN, EcoNOMIC IMPACTS OF CASINO 
GAMING IN THE UNITED STATES: MACRO SruDY, ExEcunvESUMMARY 1 (Dec. 1996) (prepared 
for the Am. Gaming Ass'n) [hereinafterANDERSENMACROS11JDY,BxEc. SUMMARY]; ARTHUR 
ANDERSEN, EcONOMIC IMPACTS OF CASINO GAMING IN THE UNITED STATES: MICRO S11JDY 8 
(May 1997) (prepared for the Am. Gaming Ass'n) [hereinafter ANDERSEN MICRO SruDY]. For 
critical analysis, see U.S. and International Costs, supra note 1, at nn.6-8. 
81. See, e.g., GooDMAN, supra note 7, at exec. summary, 68. 
82. See Charles Leven et al., The Economic Impact of Gaming in Missouri 73 (1998) 
(commissioned by Civic Progress) [hereinafter Civic Progress Report]. 
83. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
84. See, e.g., Professor Wi11iam Eadington, Remarks at the lOth International 
Conference on Gambling and Risk Taking (May 31·June 4, 1997) (on file with author). 
85. ANDERSEN MACROSruDY, supra note 80, at 1; see also ANDERSENMACROSruDY, 
EXEC. SUMMARY, supra note 80, at 1; ANDERSEN MICRO SruDY, supra note 80, at 8. All of 
these reports were commissioned by the American Gaming Association and included the 
disclaimer: "[T]his study makes no attempt to analyze the socioeconomic effects of ... gaming." 
86. See ANDERSEN MICRO SruDY, supra note 80, at 8. 
87. See Eadington, supra note 84. 
QQt'_ ;,1 
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Wisconsin.89 Within the "feeder markets" for the casinos, the results indicated 
that gambling patrons were spending 10 percent less on food and 25 percent 
less on clothing, and 37 percent had depleted their savings in order to 
gamble.90 The net costlbenefit of the legalized gambling was that Wisconsin 
was in a lose-lose socio-economic scenari091 due to local casinos. The 
in-house or "secret" studies92 of pro-gambling interests apparently support 
th~$eeconomic principles, including the economic "cannibalization" and new 
"feeder markets" created by new legalized gamblingfacilities.93 
IV. TRENDS AND CONDITIONING FACTORS 
A. Legally Buy Any Opposition: The Primary Tactic of Gambling Interests 
1. The Strategic National Problem of Corrupted United States 
DeCision-Making 
With the exception of governments, the gambling industry probably 
historically had more liquid monetary assets than any other organization. 
Gambling is an activity predicated on monetary liquidity. Since illegal 
gambling, as well as state-sponsored governmental organized gambling were 
primarily just transfers of wealth,94 the entire monetary asset base of any 
economy was theoretically s~bject to transfer to the gambling's 
owners/operators. Even the political and lobbying power of the defense 
industry, which alanned President Dwight D. Eisenhower during the 1950s 
and which prompted his precautionary speech involving the ''military 
industrial complex," could be paralleled by the liquid assets available to 
gambling's owners/operators. In his Farewell Address, President Eisenhower 
cautioned: 
In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted 
influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The 
potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. We must 
89. See, e.g., THoMPSON BT AL, WIS. POL'y REs. INST., supra note 30. 
90. See itl. at 25. 
91. See id. at 42. 
92. See Gary Thompson, Secret Study: Nationwide Spread of Gaming Hurts LV, 
LAs VEGAS SUN, May 15, 1998, available at http://www.1asvegassun.comlsunbinlstoriesltextl 
1998/rnayll 51507218527 .html. 
93. See itl. 
0.4 .~"- "-_,,_ PAm A ~.unrr:'~nJJ 'R.l"nJJnurr~ .4?4; flnth lOti 107'" 
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never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic 
processes.95 
By comparison, the 2002 Economic Stimulus Package,96 designed to respond 
to the terrorist destruction of the World Trade Center, did not include any 
significant tax credits in its $100 billion program for consumer-oriented 
businesses such as a proposed $2 to $3 billion for the United States auto 
industry.97 However, the gambling lobbyists slipped into the Stimulus bill a 
$40-billion tax write-off for slot machines98 to benefit gambling companies, 
and they almost received a tax. write-off totaling $133 billion.99 This amount 
would have equated to approximately one-third of the total United States 
defense budget. 100 
Economic historical trends demonstrate that decriminalized gambling 
interests will eventually dominate, destabilize, and destroy their host 
governments. 101 
2. The Regional Problem of Corrupted State Decision-Making 
If the proposed gambling facility constituted an economic loss to a state 
or even if there were regulatory improprieties, the solution of the 
pro-gambling interests was often legally to persuade the decision-makers via 
enormous financial incentives. 102 For example, in lllinois during 2002 
95. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Farewell Radio and Television Address to the American 
People, Jan. 17, t 961, in PUBUC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: DWIGHT 
D. EISENHOWER 1035,421, 1038 (1961). 
96. See Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of2002, Pub. L. No. 107-147, 116 
Stat. 21 (codified as amended in scattered sections of26, 29, & 42 U.S.C.). 
97. See,e.g.,JimDrinkard,HouseO/(sSJOOB!orEconomy:StimulusBill'sTaxBreaks 
Face Fight in the Senate, USA TODAY, Oct. 25, 2001, at AS, available at 2001 WL5474595. 
98. See Tony Batt, Tax Break/or Slots OK'd: Measure Will Let Companies Deduct 
Technological Expenses, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., Oct. 16,2001. 
99. Seeid. 
100. See, e.g., OmcE OF THE UNDER SEC'y OF DEF., U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., NATIONAL 
DEFENSE BUDGET ESTIMATES FOR FY 2002 (2001), available at 
http://www.dtic.miVcomptroller/fy2002budgetlfy02grbk.pdf; Press Release, United States 
Department of Defense, Department of Defense Amended Budget for FY 2002 (June 27,2001), 
at http://www.defenselink.mil/newsllun20011b0627200I_bt287-01.htm1;H.R.REP.NO. 
106-945 (2000). 
101. See, e.g., John Warren Kindt, Follow the Money: Gambling, Ethics, and Subpoenas, 
556 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 85 (1998). 
102. See Associated Press, Casino Offers 1300 Million to State, NEWS-GAZETTE, 
Apr. 10,2002, at B4 [hereinafter Casino Offers S300 Million to State]; see also John Warren 
Kindt, The Failure to Regulate the Gambling Industry Effectively: Incentives for Perpetual 
Non-Compliance, 27 S. ILL U. L.J. 219 (2003). 
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"Emerald Casino officials ... offered $300 million to the state as part of a 
push to persuade lliinois regulators to approve a casino in Rosemont, ,,103 even 
though in 2001 it had been reported that the lllinois Gaming Board had 
"declared the company unfit to operate a casino in lllinois."I04 The Emerald 
officials appealed that decision while simultaneously "seeking the board's 
approval of a $615 million buyout by MGM Mirage Inc. of Las Vegas."los 
Both the appeal and the buyout proposal eventually failed during 2002, but the 
$300 million offer to the state of lliinois demonstrated the true value of a 
$25,000 casino license in lliinois. The national press complained that aides 
to lliinois Governor George Ryan were "lecturing the supposedly independent 
members of the lllinois Gaming Board" on the benefits of an approval.106 The 
governor's aides argued that the "state budget sure could use its cut ofa deal 
that would bail out Emerald shareholders." 107 However, the Chicago Tribune 
editorialized that "[Governor] Ryan has no business trying to influence the 
Gaming Board-especiallywhen serious charges against Emerald officials are 
on the table."'os 
B. The Monopoly Export Economics of Decriminalized United States 
Gambling Activities 
Historical economics indicated that state-sanctioned or "decriminalized" 
gambling activities created a monopoly export economy. 109 The appearance 
of new net jobs, higher tax revenues, and other benefits would generally be 
created for the gambling community by tourists from other communities. 1 10 
However, the economic and social problems of gambling remained hidden, 
and of course, pro-gambling interests had large financial incentives not to 
reveal the socio-economic problems that decades of licensed gambling 
activities in Nevada and Atlantic City had exposed. 
'For Nevada, and later Atlantic City, gambling provided what experts termed a 
monopoly export economy-the popular conception of gambling as, a model for 
economic development in which new jo~ higher tax revenues, and other economic 
benefits are created for a local economy by tourists &om other locations. This model 
offered the added benefit of hiding the economic and social problems of 
103. Casino Offers $300 Million to State, supra note 102. 
104. [d. 
105. [d. 
106. Editorial, Resist the Casino Squeeze, CHI. TRm., May 9, 2002, § I, at 30. 
107. [d. 
108. [d. 
109. See 142 CONGo REc. H167S, H1678 (dailyed. Mar. S, 1996) (statement of Rep. 
LaFalce) [hereinafter Statement of Rep. LaFalce]. 
110. See id. 
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gambling-including bankruptcies, gambling addiction and crime-which tourists 
simply took home with them. III 
In 1996 these concepts were apparent to United States Representatives, such 
as John LaFalce (D-N.Y.) and Frank Wolf (R-Va.), who eventually 
co-sponsored the legislation that fmally established the 1999 National 
Gambling Impact Study Commission. 
As United States gambling spread, it became more publicly apparent that 
the monopoly export economic model was not a valid strategy for economic 
development. 112 The original casinos that brought the illusion of net benefits 
and economic growth in 1994 were going bankrupt by 1996,113 which meant 
that they continually had to focus on increasing the geographic scope of the 
gambling as well as the speed of the gambling to increase the flow of 
gambling dollars. I 14 
111. Id. at H 1678. Throughout the 1990s multiple sources reported increasing 
percentages of pathological ("addicted") and problem gamblers in the United States population 
base as gambling was legalized in various jurisdictions. For early tables categorizing 
pathological and problem gambling studies, see John Warren Kindt, The Economic Impacts of 
Legalized Gambling Activities, 43 DRAKE L. REv. 51,89, tbl.2 (1994); ALTA. loTTERIES & 
GAMING, GAMBLING AND PROBLEM GAMBLING IN AlBERTA 18 (Jan. 1994). However, it was 
2003 before there was a significant study forthcoming from Nevada, and it reported that there 
were 20,000 to 40,000 pathological gamblers in the southern part of the state alone, which 
according to conservative estimates costs Nevada $300-$900 million per year. See R. Keith 
Schwer et at., Beyond the Limits of Recreation: Social Costs of Gambling in Southern Nevada 
(2003) (on file with author); Rod Smith, Problem Gambling's Social Costs High, Report Says, 
LAS VEGAS REv.-J., Feb. 13,2003, at http://reviewjournal.comllvrLhornel2003IFeb-13-Thu-
2003/newsl20669247.html. 
Significantly, in 2003 Nevada Governor Kenny Guinn's speech on the "State of the 
State" revealed: 
For years, our economy has depended almost exclusively on tourism and gaming, 
rather than by exporting goods and services. Three out of every four of our tax 
dollars are collected from sales and gaming taxes; taxes vulnerable to swings in the 
economy. Implicit in this tax strategy was a belief that the revenues from gaming and 
tourism could keep pace with our growing and diverse population. Unfortunately, 
this [tax] strategy has failed .... [T]he lesson from the last 20 years is clear; our 
revenue system is broken because it has relied on regressive and unstable taxes 
[largely from gambling operations]. 
Nevada Governor Kenny Guinn, State of the State, Address to Nevada (Jan. 20, 2003), at 
http://www.nga.orgigovernorsll.1169.C_SPEECW·D_4953.00.html[hereinafter Nev. 
Governor's Address to the State]. The Nevada Governor then intimated that taxes would have 
to increase to address a $1 billion shortfall that was projected to continue to increase. See id. 
112. See supra note n and accompanying text. 
113. See Statement of Rep. lafalce, supra note 109, at H1678. 
114. See, e.g., U.S. and International Costs, supra note 1. 
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As gambling has spread across the United States, and even to locations on our border 
with Canada, it has become clear that this model of gambling as economic 
development is no longer effective. States and localities now compete with Indian 
reservations, with other States and with other countries to lure potential gamblers or, 
at minimum, to keep their own gambling revenues at home. Casinos that were touted 
as bringing jobs and economic enrichment to communities in 1994 are now going 
bankrupt. liS 
As delimited by the United States gambling industry itself, the proper 
foci for costlbenefit analyses were the 35-mile and l00-mile "feeder markets" 
aro\Uld the gambling facilities. I 16 When these "feeder markets" were 
extrapolated throughout regional United States economies, they created what 
the gambling industry referred to as "convenience gambling."117 In 
convenience gambling scenarios, discretionary spending and nondiscretionary 
"addicted gambling" dollars were transferred from other forms of consumer 
expenditures into the convenient gambling facilities. I 18 Local competing 
businesses were thereby losing revenue.119 In other words, economic loss, 
rather than economic growth, was occurring in many communities with 
gambling establishments. 120 This process of gambling activities 
"cannibalizing" the consumer economy was recognized in the 1996 United 
States Congressional debates: 121 
.Wbatwe now have is an economic model of gambling that the casino industry itself 
refers to as "convenience" gambling. Rather than confining gambling to specific 
locations for purposes of economic development, gambling is made readily available 
to aU potential customers. In a' convenience gambling economy, discretionary 
spending is diverted from other forms of entertainment and consumer expenditures 
to casinos and other gambling establishments. Restaurants, hotels, and other 
competing local businesses lose revenues and fail. Scarce resources are diverted to 
the least productive local activities and economic wealth becomes concentrated in 
fewer and fewer hands. In short, rather than the economic panacea promised by 
115. Statement of Rep. LaFalce, supra note 109, at H1678. 
116. See, e.g., HARRAH'S CASINOS, HARRAH'S SURVEY OF CASINO ENTERTAINMENT 
20-21 (1996). 
117. SeegenerallyNGISCFINALREPORT,supranote 18,at3-18(recommendation3.6), 
7-10, 7-11. 
118. See id. 
119. See id. 
120. Seeid. 
121. See ANDERSEN MACRO STUDY, supra note 80. The Arthur Andersen Macro Study 
financed by the American Gaming Association lobbying group was designed in part to discredit 
economic experts who indicated that legalized gambling activities "cannibalized" the consumer 
economy. Paradoxically, the American Gaming Association! Andersen Macro Study was itself 
discredited, particularly after the demise of the Arthur Andersen Company in 200 1 and 2002 
due to scandals involving the company's reporting practices. See ide 
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gambling promoters, the opposite of economic development appears to be occurring 
in many communities. 122 
These conclusions were largely confirmed by the 1999 United States 
Gambling Commission in its Final Report,123 and accompanying Executive 
Summary.l24 In fact, even the pro-industry Commissioners on the NGISC 
joined with the entire Commission to recommend unanimously that 
convenience gambling activities be recriminalized,125 and that there be a 
moratorium on the expansion of United States gambling.126 
C. The United States Government Trend Toward Creating New Addicted 
Gamblers and the Business Interface 
1. Pavlovian Marketing: Hooking New Addicted Gamblers? 
In 2000, Psychology Professor Calvin Claus summarized the basic 
psychological principles causing pathological (i.e., "addicted") gambling.127 
Since World War II, research psychologists in the area of Behavior Analysis 
had been researching the processes involved in shaping human and animal 
behavior,l28 but little of that research information about shaping and 
consequences was understood by the public.129 Professor Claus categorically 
rejected the statements of pro-gambling lobbyists, 130 such as Frank Fahrenkopf 
of the American Gaming Association (AGA), who argued that the lobbyists 
knew the "science."131 Instead, Professor Claus enumerated the scientific 
principles involved as ''beyond controversy,"132 and cited to the basic textbook 
Schedules of Reinforcement by famed Harvard Psychology Professor B. F. 
122. Statement of Rep. LaFalce, supra note 109, at H1678. 
123. See NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 2-4,2-5. 
124. See NGISC ExEcUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 18, at 30. 
125. See id. (recommendation 3.6). 
126. See NOISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 18, at introduction by Connnission Chair 
Kay C. James. 
127. See Professor Emeritus Calvin K. Claus, Gambling Behavior: Enticement then 
Addiction, Presentation Before the Illinois Gaming Board (May 3,2000) [hereinafter Professor 
Claus] (on file with author). 
128. See id. 
129. See ill. 
130. See ill. 
131. See Frank Fahrenkopf, Compulsive Gambling, Presentation Before the Illinois 
Gaming Board (May 3, 2000). 
132. See Professor Claus, supra note 127. 
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Skimier.133 The Pavlovian aspects of gambling were summarized as "[p ]igeon, 
rat or human, gambling is addictive. ,,134 
If you want to train a laboratory rat to push a button, don't reward him with a food 
pellet after every push - vary the number of pushes required for the payoff. Give him 
a penet after· four pushes one time, 16 the next, then three, then 23. 
By manipulating the length between payoffs, researchers can lead a rat, pigeon or 
human into addictive behaviors. 
"'They could stretch the ratio to the point where that rat would literally drop over from 
exhaustion," [Professor Claus noted]. 135 
In fact, exhausted and oblivious gamblers were a common problem in 
gambling facilities, particularly casinos. 136 
First, the basic behaviors relating to gambling problems were the 6 "P's" 
(pushing, pulling, pressing, placing, picking, or pointing actions). 137 Each of 
these actions was "aimed at a particular name, number, color or picture,"138 
and the consequence, one of the crucial elements, was either ''win or loss."139 
"The second vital condition [was] the pattern, schedule or sequence of wins 
compared to the number of tries or moves."I40 If the ratio of tries to wins was 
an uncertainty, then the system was "known as a variable ratio schedule of 
reinforcement."141 This ratio could be demonstrated in psychological 
laboratories throughout academia, and it was also "characteristic of all 
gambling situations."142 These principles led to the "concept of [gambling] 
addiction," as the variable schedule of reinforcement would operate to 
produce an addiction to gambling143 in a percentage of the public. l44 
These principles were beyond dispute. In 1977, after the fIrSt United 
States lottery in New Hampshire and while Atlantic City was in the process 
oflegalizing casinos, Harvard Psychology Professor B. F. Skinner utilized his 
international renown, and in the New York Times he satirized the arguments 
133. See C.B. FERSTER&B. F. SKINNER, SCHEDULES OF REINFORCEMENT (1957). 
134. Burt Constable, Pigeon, Rat or Human, Gambling Is Addictive, DAILY HERAlD 
(Arlington Heights, III.), May 6, 2000, at 8. 
135. Id. 
136. See itl. 
J 37. See Professor Claus, supra note 127. 
138. Id. 
139. See itl. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. Professor Claus, supra note 127. 
144. See itl. 
2003] The Transfer of Consumer Dollars to Legalized Gambling 303 
of pro-gambling interests. 145 Professor Skinner began with the psychological 
basics, "[p ]eople are not born gamblers. They become gamblers when 
exposed to certain sequences of lucky hits.,,146 Then he asked satirically, 
"Why should our schools not be used to expose everyone to such 
sequences?,,147 The progression would be a system of lotteries from 
kindergarten to high school to hook students on them. 148 According to 
Skinner, the odds should grow as the children grew older until they found ''the 
standard lottery with its meager odds irresistible. ,,149 Since the schools would 
bear the administrative expenses, Skinner opined that ''the entire operation 
will be much more profitable than the regular lottery. ,,150 The result would be 
graduates who continued to play the lottery for the rest of their lives,151 and 
Skinner noted that this system would "create vast numbers of young people 
who come on the market each year as dedicated (should we care if 
psychiatrists call them pathological?) gamblers.,,152 As was already the tax 
scenario in Nevada, Professor Skinner sardonically noted that "by the end of 
five years I estimate that sales taxes can be abolished and that after 25 years 
(and we must look ahead!) there will be absolutely no need for state income 
taxes. ,,1S3 Mocking the arguments of gambling lobbyists,154 Skinner was 
"looking forward to the day when the support of our Government-in city, 
state and nation-will be entirely voluntary.,,155 While "[e]conomists will 
point out that money spent for lottery tickets will not be spent for goods and 
services and that business will suffer,,156 Skinner satirically concluded that 
''the loss will be more than offset by the absence of taxes and by the money 
won.,,157 
145. See B. F. Skinner, Freedom, at Last, From the Burden of Taxation, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 26, 1977, at 29. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. See also Douglas A. Abbott et al., Pathological Gambling and the Family: 
Practice Implications, 76FAMS. INSOC'Y: J. CONTEMP. HUM. SERVIC£S 213 (1995). 
148. See Skinner, supra note 145, at 29. 
149. [d. 
150. Id. 
151. See id. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
154. Skinner, supra note 145, at 29. 
ISS. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. 
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fu this context, the severely addictive nature of legalized gambling was 
highlighted by a 1998 case in which a mother addicted to gamblingl58 
allegedly killed one and perhaps two of her children in separate instances to 
collect $200,000 in insurance funds so she could continue to gamble. 159 The 
mother in this case was convicted and imprisoned. 
2. Creating New Addicted Gamblers and the Business Interface 
From a social-justice perspective it is well-established that "[p ]oor and 
working people spend a disproportionate share of their incomes on 
gambling."I60 Accordingly, tax revenues based on gambling come 
"disproportionately from lower income residents, causing a regressive form 
of taxation. ,,161 Furthermore, it appears that problematic gambling behaviors 
are greatest among the poor and minorities. 162 Interestingly, in 1993 a "Gallup 
survey revealed that 66 percent of New Jersey residents agree that gambling 
encourages people who can least afford it to spend money gambling, and 
57 percent agree that it can make compulsive [i.e., pathological] gamblers out 
of people who would not participate in illegal gambling."l63 
In addition, entrepreneurs in businesses such as restaurants, 
entertainment, tourism, and others are concerned with the "cannibalization" 
of their consumer dollars by the gambling industry.l64 In the 1994 United 
States Congressional hearings, it was highlighted that decriminalized 
158. See Cam Simpson, Baby Death Plot Told: Suburb Mom Indicted in Insurance 
Scheme, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 7, 1998, at 1; Matt O'Connor, Prison Sentence in Baby's 
Killing: Mom Used Insurance Money for Gambling, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 9, 1999, § 2, at 6. 
159. See id. Apparently disturbed by the concept of pathological gambling being 
delimited as an "addiction," pro-gambling interests have supported re-evaluations, as 
exemplified by a meeting held December 8-10,2002, at the Las Vegas Mirage Hotel-Casino. 
The conference titled "Rethinking Addiction: How Gambling and Other Behavioral Addictions 
are Changing the Concept and Treatment of Alcohol and Substance Use Disorders" was 
sponsored by three organizations largely-funded by pro-gambling interests: (I) the National 
Center for Responsible Gaming (NCRG), (2) the Nevada Council on Problem Gambling, and 
(3) the Institute for Research on Pathological Gambling and Related Disorders, Harvard Medical 
School's Division on Addictions. See Conference, Rethinking Addiction: How Gamblillg alld 
Other Behavioral Addictions Are Changing the Concept and Treatment of Alcohol alld 
Substance Use Disorders, Dec. 8-10, 2002. 
160. FLA. Gov. REPORT, supra note 21, at 69. 
161. Id. 
162. See id. 
163. Id. (citation omitted). See generally, Laura Parker, Gambler Says Casino Played 
Him, USA TODAY, Feb. 21, 2003, at A3. 
164. See Congressional Gambling Hearing /994, supra note 8, at 87 (statement of Rep. 
Wolf). 
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gambling activities did "not necessarily stimulate demand for entertainment, 
it merely shift[ed] disposable income from one expenditure to casinos."16s 
Testimony at the hearings indicated that such "cost shifting [did] not stimulate 
other sectors of the economy and may even be a net loss [negative 
multiplier]."I66 It was summarized that "as gambling increases, expenditures 
for clothing, recreation services, business services, new cars and service 
stations will decline."167 
V. POLICY ALTERNATIVES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. All Economic Analyses Should Include a Socio-Economic "Crime 
Multiplier" Interfaced with the New Addicted Gamblers, New 
Bankruptcies, and New Crime Associated with Decriminalized 
Organized Gambling 
In 1998, a Missouri studyl68 calculated that the multiplier effect of 
legalized gambling casinos in Missouri was approximately" 1.7. ,,169 If those 
same dollars had been spent in the regular consumer economy, the anticipated 
multiplier effect would have been between "2" and "3." This study seemed 
to confirm the concerns of economists that legalized gambling activities 
constituted a net drain on the consumer economy. In testimony before the 
National Gambling Impact Study Commission on May 20, 1998, one of the 
economists conducting this study highlighted some of these 
concerns-including the fact that traditional economic studies did not account 
for the projected increases in new pathological gamblers, new bankruptcies, 
and new crime occasioned by the spread and government endorsement of 
legalized gambling activities. 17o Despite the references by the gambling 
industry to the contrary, the traditional RIMS multipliers and the appropriate 
categories contained therein established by the BEA did not include any 
specific categories relating to "legalized gambling activities. ,,171 Accordingly, 
economists often tried to categorize gambling activities under entertainment 
or some other tangential category contained in the RIMS analyses. l72 Since 
165. [d. 
166. [d. 
167. [d. See also Congressional Gambling Hearing 1995, supra note 8. 
168. See Civic Progress Report, supra note 82. 
169. Seeid. 
170. See Don Phares, Testimony Before the National Gambling Impact Study 
Commission (May 20, 1998). 
171. For the specific categories, see RIMS 1997, supra note 5. 
172. See id. 
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. legalized gambling activities constituted a relatively new phenomenon of the 
20th century, the traditional United States economic analyses did not include 
legalized gambling activities as economic development activities. 173 They 
were also not included as a specific category in the RIMS analysis 
methodology. 174 This led to the question of whether legalized gambling 
activities should be included via a new category. There would probably be 
significant economic resistance from academia to such a proposal, because a 
new category for legalized gambling activities would technically disrupt the 
organizational system for RIMS as utilized for several years. 175 
This scenario also leads to the question of whether legalized gambling 
activities should be marginalized by a socio-economic "crime multiplier" due 
to the new pathological gamblers, new bankruptcies, and new crime associated 
with the advent oflegalized gambling activities in a non-gambling economy. 
The socio-economic negatives were highlighted in the 1999 National 
Gambling Impact Study Commission, Final Report. 176 
B. The 1999 United States Gambling Commission's Unanimous 
Recommendation for a Moratorium on the Spread of Any Type of 
Gambling Anywhere in the United States Should Be Implementedl77 
In 1999 the Final Report of the United States Gambling Commission 
unanimously recommended a moratorium on the spread of any type of 
gambling anywhere in the United StateS.178 However, after the terrorist 
attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, the United States 
pro-gambling interests maneuvered 26 proposals for increased gambling onto 
ballot initiatives for 2002.179 Promoting increased United States gambling as 
a solution to the economic problems occasioned by the World Trade Center 
attacks. constituted an insincere public relations tactic by the United States 
gambling industry--considering the numerous authoritative reports 
173. See id. 
174. See id. 
175. See generally id. 
176. See generally, NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 18. 
177. See id. at introduction by Commission Chair Kay C. James. 
178. See id. 
179. See February, 2002 Newsletter (Nat'l Coalition Against Legalized Gambling), Feb. 
2002, at http://www.ncaJg.orglnews-feb2002.htm. 
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concluding that state-sponsored gambling is inimical to the stability of the 
United States economy. ISO 
As properly-conducted costlbenefit studies of statewide impacts 
demonstrated throughout the 1990s, lSI decriminalized gambling activities 
cannibalized the consumer economy.IS2 For example, lllinois studies 
paralleled the moratorium recommendation of the 1999 United States 
Gambling Commission. In Illinois it was recommended in 1996 that the 
"number of licenses for riverboat casinos should not be expanded."ls3 After 
analyzing the lllinois costlbenefit studies, a 1996 study by William Thompson 
and Ricardo Gazel concluded that there "should be no additional casino 
gambling if that gambling is made generally accessible to the public at-large" 
as riverboat gambling is. IS4 Their study also suggested that "[ c ]asinos should 
be required to have disincentives for local gamblers and lower income 
gamblers"ISS such as "mandatory parking fees, higher mandatory admission 
fees that may not be waived, and dress codes during peak seasons."IS6 
Importantly, it was concluded that "[c]asinos should eliminate the use of 
money machines."187 Furthermore, it was apparent that lllinois "should fund 
a comprehensive study of crime incidence in casino counties and other 
counties before and after the introduction of casinos and seek to assess the 
costs (or removal of costs) of crime because ofcasinos."ls8 While the state of 
lllinois never funded such a study, Casinos and CrimelS9 in 1999 did perform 
the ''before and after" crime analysis for each United States casino county and 
180. See, e.g., Kindt, Strategic Economic Base, supra note 20; U.S. and International 
Costs, supra note 1. See generally, NGISC FINALREPORT,supra note 18. For informational 
sources and analyses, see John Warren Kindt &. Anne E. C. Brynn, Destructive Economic 
. Policies in the Age of Te"orism: Government-Sanctioned Gambling as Encouraging 
Transboundary Economic Raiding and Destabilizing National and International Economies, 
16 TEMP. INT'L &. COMPo L.J. 243 (2002); John Warren Kindt &. John K. Palchak, Legalized 
Gambling's Destabilization of u.s. Financial Institutions and the Banking Industry: Issues in 
Bankruptcy, Credit, and Social Norm Production, 19 EMORY U.L., BANKR. DEV. J. 21 (2002); 
John Warren Kindt &. Stephen W. Joy, Internet Gambling and the Destabilization of National 
and International Economies: Time for a Comprehensive Ban on Gtimbling Over the World 
Wide Web, 80 DENY. U. L. REv. 111 (2002). 
181. See supra notes 20, 52-75 and accompanying text. 
182. See supra notes 20, 52-75 and accompanying text. 
183. Thompson &. Gazel, supra note 31, at 11. 
184. Id. at 11. 
185. Id. at 13. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. 
188. Id. at 14. 
189. See Grinols et aI., Casinos and Crime, supra note 24, at 29. 
il 
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concluded that crime increased approximately 1 0 per~ent during the third year 
after the casinos opened190 and cont~nued to increase thereafter. 191 
CONCLUSION 
The concept of applying a socio-economic "crime" multiplier to certain 
_ a~tivities like gambling may at first se~m to be somewhat unusual. However, 
this concept is a valid one and can be visualized in the context of iilegal drugs -
where some economists would argue that this market has the same negative 
effect. 192 In addition, sociologists and government officials would argue that 
the socio-economic impacts of transactions involving illegal drugs constitute 
a net drain on society and that they are therefore illegal as a matter of public 
policy. 
Similarly, gambling activities were illegal in the United States 
throughout most of the 20th century. The fact that numerous gambling 
activities were legalized in the 1980s and 1990s did not change their economic 
consequences and in fact exacerbated the negative social consequences due 
to the "acceptability factor" and the "accessibility factor." Like illegal 
drugs,193 legal or -illegal gambling activities create pathological ("addicted") 
gamblers, new bankruptcies, and new crime l94-as highlighted in the Final 
Report195 0fthe 1999 National Gambling Impact Study Commission. 196 In the 
-context of illegal drugs, presumably a socio-economicJllultiplierwould be so 
overwhelmingly negative that those substances would continue to remain 
criminalized. 197 However, the economic effects oflegalizing drugs would not 
necessarily be the same as those affecting gambling. 198 
F or most ofthe 20th century economists and sociologists found legalized 
gambling activities to be so overwhelmingly negative in their combined 
190. See id. 
191. See id. 
192. See William N. Thompson, Gambling: A Controlled Substance, PITTSBURGH POST -
GAZETTE, Aug. 14, 1994, at E 1, reprinted in Frontline, Gambling: A Controlling Substance, 
at http://www. pbs. org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/gamble/procon/thompson.html [hereinafter 
Gambling: A Controlled Substance] (last visited Apr. 10, 2003). 
193. See id. 
194. See id.; see also U.S. and International Costs, supra note 1. 
195. See generally NGISC FINAL REpORT, supra note 18. 
196. See id. 
- 197. See, e.g. , Medical Marijuana Referenda Movement in America: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Crime of the House Co,fzm. on the Judiciary, 1 05th Congo (1997)~ TEx, COMM'N 
ON ALCOHOL & DRUG ABUSE, GAMBLING IN TEXAS: 1992 TEXAS SURVEY OF ADOLESCENT 
GAMBLING BEHAVIOR (1993). 
198. See Gambling: A Controlled Substance, supra note 192. 
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effects that they remained criminalized. As the 21 st century dawned with the 
decriminalization of several types of gambling activities in the United States, 
perhaps the time had also dawned for the institution of a socio-economic 
"crime" multiplier to be combined with the presumably positive "economic 
multiplier" associated and touted by the gambling industry to justify the 
spread of legalized gambling activities and the decriminalization thereof. 
It could be argued, perhaps convincingly, that any costlbenefit analysis 
involving the spread oflegalized gambling activities must necessarily include 
the negatives attributed to sociological and economic impacts. For example, 
Professors Earl Grinols and David Mustard have convincingly demonstrated 
that in the third year after casinos open, the crime rate in their "feeder 
markets" (which roughly parallels the counties in which they are located) 
increases approximately 10' percent ::~nd trends· upward thereafter. 199 
Furthermore, the tables in the Mega-Lawsuits article,20o as well as the Final 
Report of the NGISC,201 contain numerous sources/citations relating to the 
socio-economic negatives associated with the spread of gambling 
activities-particularly "legalized" gambling activities.202 Accordingly, a 
"socio-economic multiplier" or "crime multiplier" (which appears to be 
negative to some degree) appears to be an essential element of any costlbenefit 
economic analysis utilizing RIMS and concomitant economic multipliers 
relating to the gambling industry and its activities. 
Apparently well acquainted with these socio-economic negatives, the 
lobbyists for the gambling industry ha,:"e ~een marginalizing and minimalizing 
the socio~economic negatives, and some of the problems involving the 
199. See Grinols et aI., Casinos and Crime, supra note 24. 
200. See Kindt, Mega-Lawsuits, supra note 1, at 44-63, tbls.AI-A14. 
201. SeeNGISCFINALREpORT,supranote 18, at 4-1 to 4-9, 7-1 to 7-34. 
202. See id. 
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lobbyists' influence within the academic community have been highlighted in 
the Mega-Lawsuits article.203 
In 2001, former United States Senator Paul Simon, one of the chief 
legislative sponsors of the 1999 United States Gambling Commission, 
summarized the social and governmental' problems of decriminalized 
gambling.204 
Some weeks ago a man in Detroit got hooked on gambling, stole 5500,000 
from his business, piled up credit card debt of 560,000 - and then went home and 
killed his children -7,5 and 2 - and his pregnant wife and then killed himself. He 
203. See, e.g., informational sources and citations detailed in Kindt, Mega-Lawsuits, 
supra note I, at 20-21 , 27-28, 31-34. In one scenario in 2002, the Greater Omaha Chamber of 
Commerce sponsored a study on the feasibility of a casino in Omaha, Nebraska. See Ernest 
Goss, The Economic Impact of an Omaha, Nebraska Casino, Aug. 12, 2002 [hereinafter 
Nebraska Casino Impact]. This study had some interesting analysis despite the Chamber's 
apparent pro-casino biases and ''promotion of gambling in Nebraska" Editorial, What is 
Chamber Hiding?, OMAHA WORLD-HERAlD, Dec. 15,2002, at 12B. The Omaha Chamber 
apparently ignored the precedent established by the Greater Washington, D.C. Board of Trade 
whose 85 members had voted unanimously against Mayor Sharon Pratt Kelly's 1993 proposal 
to bring a casino to Washington, D.C. See John Warren Kindt, The Negative Impacts of 
Legalized Gambling on Businesses, 4 U. MIAMI Bus. L.J. 93, 111 (1994); John Warren Kindt, 
The Business-Economic Impacts of Licensed Casino Gambling in West Virginia: Short-Term 
Gain but Long-Term Pain, 13 W. VA. PUB. AFF. REp. 22, 23 (1996); Liz Spayd & Yolanda 
Woodlee, Trade Board Rejects D.C. Casino Plan, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 1993, at AI. 
Significantly, the Omaha study reported that of the 57 communities analyzed, approximately 
half (24) with casinos, lost net jobs, while half (33) gained net jobs, but there was apparently 
no regression analysis of those communities regarding gainingllosing jobs. Furthermore, the 
net job losses were concentrated in the agricultural, manufacturing, and services sectors. See 
Nebraska Casino Impact, supra. Importantly, Nebraska Governor Mike Johanns appeared to 
reject the economic claims of the pro-gambling interests, and even cited to Nevada Governor 
Kenny Guinn's negative statements about utilizing legalized gambling as a source of tax 
revenues. See Robynn Tysver, Teen Gambling Worries Johanns, OMAHA WORLD-HERAlD, 
Mar. 10,2003, at IB, 2B; see also Nev. Governor's Address to the State, supra note 111. 
In another scenario in 2003, a Pennsylvania study that was sponsored in 2001 by 
pro-gambling interests analyzed transforming four racetracks into ''racinos'' by allowing the 
tracks to have casino-style video gambling machines. See INST. OF STATE & REG'L AFFAIRS, 
PENN STATE HARRISBURG, THE EcONOMIC IMPACT OF HORSE RACING ON THE EcONOMY OF 
PENNSYLVANIA (2001) (pSH Study). Professor Robert Goodman of the University of 
Massachusetts and Professor Edward Feser of the University of North Carolina critiqued the 
PSH Study and concluded that it was "inaccurate and misleading" and "fail [ ed] to meet even 
the barest minimum standards." Robert Goodman & Edward Feser, The Economic Impacts of 
Introducing Slot Machines at Racetracks in Pennsylvania: A Review of the Penn State 
Harrisburg Study, 3 CoMMONWEALTH POL'y BRIEF, Feb. 2003, at 4, 9; see also Press Release, 
The Commonwealth Foundation, Penn State Gambling Study "Inaccurate and Misleading," 
Professors Say (Feb. 25, 2003). 
204. See Paul Simon, Commentary on the Gambling Industry (NPR radio broadcast, 
June S, 2001) (former United States Senator). 
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wrote in his suicide note: "There is nothing more destructive to life than gambling. 
I wonder why there are government agencies to fight drugs and not gambling." 
A few days ago I stopped at a service station and a shabbiJy dressed man in the 
line ahead of me pulled out a tattered billfold and carefully emptied its contents of 
53 1 for lottery tickets. 
The industry's large contributions to political candidates is their insurance, 
their protection money. Often it is not as subtle as campaign contributions, but crude, 
simply bribery.20S 
These types of socio-economic consequences dictate the inclusion of a socio-
econorruc "crime multiplier" in any costlbenefit analyses of gambling 
. activities. 
205. Id. 
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Appendix: Business Economics of Licensed Organized Gambling 
BEFORE 
Non-Gamblin, Economv 
Speed o/Gambling 
Marijuana o/Gambling 
• Dog &, Horse Tracks 
• Lotteries 
25% Less Clothes' 
37% Less Savings' 
• Bingo • Off-Track Betting 
3S-Mile Feeder Market 
1 Mile 
CASINO 
NewJoh=S11 
New Tax Rev. =$1 2 
Lost Jobs = _I' 
Taxpayer Social Cost = 534 
Crime = +50-1()()oA,s 
Business &, Personal Bankruptcies = +18-42%6 
Drive-by Business = -65%7 
AFTER 
Gamblin, Economv 
Crack Cocaine o/Gambling 
• Casinos, Video Machines, 
Internet (iJlegal) 
More 
Pathological 
Gamblers9 
(Caused By) 
More 
Legalization9 = 
(Acceptability 
Factor) 
Spread of 
Gambling' = 
(Accessibility 
Factor) 
Adult 
Population 
Avg.I_3%10 
Teen 
Population 
Avg.2-6%1I 
(Joe Camel to 
Joe Casino) 
100 Miles 
Feeder 
Market 
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